The Telangana Tangle: Biggest Loser Congress?

On 9th December, 2009, Danny Cahill became the biggest of Biggest Losers by losing an astonishing 239 pounds. But the way the Congress is handling the Telangan issue, they seem to be in a greater hurry than Cahill to shed their political wieght in Andhra Pradesh.

The fast for Telangana by KCR was a comedy of errors from Day 1. When the history of the Telangana is written, writers will probably chose to ignore the fact that KCR’s fast was a politically motivated one, or that he was forced to take the fast more seriously after being caught consuming a glass of juice on the second day. Far from being a struggle for statehood, KCR’s fast was a fight for political relevance after the drubbing in the elections earlier in the year. In fact the situation got so dire for KCR that at one stage it came to be known that he had clamped down his demand from demanding separate statehood to settling for talks with the centre. So, in effect a problem that could have been solved by holding talks, the old-fashioned way has now blown out of proportion, and it gets worse. This is not to discount the volatile situation that arose out of the largely student led movement for a separate Telangana, but as a political call by the Congress, there were other alternatives to jumping the gun on the issue.

Further, within Andhra Pradesh too, this was one crisis the Congress could have done without. It is no secret that Rosaiah is running a divided house following the unfortunate demise of YSR. With the splitting up of the state, the Congress has gone ahead and given itself an additional cause of worry with its members now squabbling over another issue. To further complicate the issue, Chief Ministerial aspirant YS Jagan has made no bones about where he stands on the issue by calling for a unified Andhra.

The Congress’ position in Andhra Pradesh is unique compared to most other states as, not only is it the only national party in a political landscape dotted by regional parties, it also controls the state. What this also translates into is that while other parties are driven by strictly regional considerations, the Congress has to keep in mind larger, national interests. So from such a standpoint, creating Telangana might not be such a bad call. But given the intervening circumstances the Congress couldn’t do better even if it wanted to hurt itself. For, the Congress has through the years exploited the Telangan issue for political mileage while not doing anything about it, meaning that it had no real stand on the issue. The other parties on the other hand have their roles cut out with the TDP (though Chandrababu Naidu has remained quiet on the issue) and PRP opposing Telangana for a unified Andhra and the TRS taking a diametrically opposite stand. Cometh the hour, they just fulfil their designated roles while the Congress, having soothed egos on both sides finds itself in no man’s land.

Evan at the Centre, the Congress finds itself in an unenviable position. Having on the one hand recognised Telangana and on the other ruled out the creation other states such as Gorkhaland, it can be construed that the Congress is applying double standards. But as in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the Congress in it’s all accomodating policy of yore simply does not have a stand on the issue of creation of new states. On the other hand, the BJP having carved out Uttarakhand, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand has gone on record to say that smaller states make for balanced development. The BJP even supports the Gorkhaland cause having allied with the GJM for the Darjeeling Lok Sabha seat. With parties taking up either side of the debate, the Congress finds itself alienating both sides by either carving out new states or not creating enough, much like Gorbachev embracing Western ideas towards the end of the Cold War.

However, given the right strategies, the Congress can still pull itself out of the rut (a rather large one) it finds itself in. Since it has already announced the creation of Telangana, it cannot retract its announcement and must find a way of amicably settling the issue. Hyderabad has occupied the centre of this debate and finding a way to balance the Telangana claim for the city on the one hand while not compromising on the development and finding adequate recompense for the other side is paramount. This does not require a miracles solution, but does require a lot of time for tempers to fall and vested interests to take a back seat. As is evident from the actions of the centre, the issue itself will be resolved in a matter of months rather than days. As regards other ‘demands’, most of them seems to be seeking the limelight rather than statehood. However, in the days to come future governments will be (or should be) more wary of conceding to demands for statehood. The focus must now be on damage control to quell dissent within party ranks.

Atmosphere of Uncertainty – What India Wants from Copenhagen

As the Indian delegation walked out of United Nations Climate Change Conference at Copenhagen along with other ‘developing nations’, Tarun Gopalakrishnan tracks India’s position on global warming since the Kyoto Protocol and looks at how India can help salvage the climate change talks.

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Copenhagen 2009 might well be the landmark conference in deciding the planet’s future. From an Indian perspective, it’s been interesting, to say the least. The signs were all there that the Indian delegation might look to turn the official Indian position on its head – Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted the willingness of the nation to achieve a 20% reduction in its carbon emissions as envisioned by its 11^th Five-Year Plan. Minister for Environment & Forests, Jairam Ramesh, urged the Indian delegation to be “pragmatic and constructive”, and not “argumentative and polemical”. Contrast this with the Indian stand thus far – India has insisted that the historical responsibility for emissions belongs to industrialized nations, has pointed to the fact that it sustains a fifth of the world’s population and has highlighted its low per-capita emissions to justify its own emissions. Add to this the Indian assertion that its status as a developing economy means that any additional demand on it – such as shifting to green technologies – would harm its development chances; and a picture is painted of a nation which is less than conducive to consensus and more inclined to protecting its interest. Which is why the shift to the current position – that of conditionally accepting part of the burden for emissions – is seen as a sellout.

This negative dichotomy has characterized the negotiation over mitigation for some two decades. Painted as a ‘developed vs. developing’ debate, the deliberations consistently veer toward the question of which group of nations to hold responsible. The Kyoto Protocol answered this question by centering the mitigation burden on developed nations. This manifestation of the Kyoto regime was based upon the concept of ‘historicity’ – currently developed nations were the first to industrialize and therefore entered the emissions arena earlier. Their past emissions record meant that they were obliged to bear the bulk of mitigation. In short, the arrangement was based on that most judicious tenet of maternal wisdom – you made the mess, now get to mopping up. While preaching “common but differentiated” responsibility, the Protocol omitted to require anything of some of the largest emitters in the world, including India and China, in terms of emission reduction. Rather, these nations were merely vehicles for mitigation for the nations who were required to meet targets. Life, in the context of greenhouse emission mitigation therefore, was a bit of a cake-walk for developing economies – India included. No expectations were placed upon them, developed nations were responsible for ensuring that green technologies were made available to them at cheaper rates and there was an in-pouring of ‘green’ investment from developed nations looking to meet their targets. The lines of engagement seemed to be pretty clearly drawn – India, as a developing nation, refused to take on any mitigation burden in the foreseeable future.

In this context, when the Indian Government spoke of burden-sharing right before Copenhagen, the diplomats did a double-take. And, mid-way through the climate change negotiation of the decade, one can forgive oneself for being a bit befuddled as to precisely what the Indian delegation is trying to achieve. At the forefront of a technology-sharing proposal on one day and allegedly part of an en masse walkout the next, it is up for debate whether India wants in or out. Does India want to go ‘green’, or does it want status quo?

It is highly possible it is the former. Consider this – India currently imports 70% of its crude oil requirements, expenditure somewhere upward of four percent of GDP. To top that, it incurs an additional expenditure in the region of two percent of GDP to clean up the effects of fossil fuels on the ecology. Contrast that with the two-and-a-half or so percent of GDP spent on education annually, and one gets an idea of where India might be looking to cut down on expenditure a smidgen. Oil imports have, for long, been an enormous drain on the nation’s finances. In recent years, policy-makers have tried to circumvent this problem by trying to evade the middlemen and invest directly in oil-fields in countries like Sudan, Syria, Iran and Nigeria. These investments, however, have drawn annoyance in diplomatic circles, primarily from the U.S., which holds rather strong views, if somewhat hypocritical, of partnerships with these nations. Besides, while buying stakes in oilfields might be a prudent mid-term strategy, it still doesn’t answer the tougher questions posed by that most demanding of timelines – the long-term. What if India could find a way to bypass the oil industry altogether? As a developing nation, it still has the flexibility to change the energy basis on which its economy functions. Seen this way, India’s efforts to green its economy sound less like an altruistic cleanup drive and more like a calculated economic choice. Put simply, in the long run, going green saves an economy a lot of money. Less money spent on fossil fuels and cleaning up after them means more spent on other crucial sectors and better all-round economic development. The major economic prizes in the next few decades might well go to the winner of the race to end dependence on fossil fuels. It makes full sense for India to get a move on.

The context in which the Indian Premier’s remarks were made now becomes clearer. They were neither an admission of liability, nor an acceptance of emission reduction targets. When Dr. Manmohan Singh says he is in favour of burden-sharing in mitigation efforts, he probably means it in the broadest possible sense – that India is looking to green its economy on its own terms. What India is looking for at Copenhagen is a way to achieve sustainable development for the Indian economy with all the help it can get, at prices it can accept. The technology centre proposal paves the way for India to gain access to green technologies at affordable prices. On the other hand, as a developing nation, India cannot let go of its original position on developed nations’ responsibilities – hence the alleged walk-out over the concern that developed nations might use Copenhagen as a basis for departure from Kyoto. Looking for economically viable solutions to green its economy and holding parties to promises previously undertaken while making none of its own, India is manoeuvring along the finest of diplomatic lines.

The Indian stance though, if properly clarified, will probably benefit the Copenhagen deliberations. Whereas the present negotiations hinge on whether nations should undertake emissions targets or not, the Indian strategy is novel – no targets, yet a commitment to sustainable development. Perhaps it is time the battle against climate change was presented as carrots, rather than sticks. India for one, I suspect, would be more than willing to eat its greens.

The Nobel President

US President Barack Obama was announced as the winner of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize on October 9th 2009  for  his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples his vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons. While the announcement shocked many, a survey of the system of awarding the Peace Prize as well as it’s past winners shows that the Norwegian Nobel Committee were not really out of line in awarding this year’s prize.

Firstly, the Peace Prize is awarded by a Committee of 5 members selected by the Norwegian legislature or Storting. So unlike the other categories, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded by politicians, and is hence coloured by the Norwegian world view. In fact the website of the Nobel prize has this to say about the Peace Prize and the Committee:

“…but, on a deeper level, they also generally reflected Norwegian definitions of the broader, Western values of an idealist, the often slightly left-of-center kind, but rarely so far left that the choices were not acceptable to Western liberal-internationalist opinion in general. The Norwegian government did not determine the choices of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, but these choices reflected the same mixture of idealism and realism that characterized Norwegian, and Scandinavian, foreign policy in general.”

So not only does the Peace Prize Committee admit that their choice is based on Norwegian ideals but they also go on to express their inclination to following  “western liberal-internationalist” values in choosing the price. While this may not ruffle too many feathers as, well, western notions of liberalism are the most rational right? Merits of any particular ideology aside, a predisposition towards one view would amount naturally amount to a disinclination towards other ideologies (amounting to the demise of the idea of the plurality of thought). To put it simply, from such a declared position, the Committe would, if it had to make a choice, choose the candidate who would ruffle fewer feathers. Thus, ruling out an objective, neutral approach which one comes to expect of a Committee invested with the responsibility of awarding what has come to be known the most prestigious prize for the preservation of peace

Alfred Nobel’s will states that the Peace Prize should be awarded by a Committee selected by the Storting. Now, the Storting though simply vested with the responsibility of selecting the Committee, has in its 100+ year history selected only previous or sitting members of the Storting i.e., politicians. The prudence of picking a Committee solely comprising politicians to award a Peace Prize (nominees of which are usually at loggerheads with the political class) is left to the imagination of the reader. Analysing the position and the ideals of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee is not merely a hairsplitting exercise as an examination of past winners shows how this bias has been repeatedly reflected in the choices of the Committee.

Barack Obama is one of four US Presidents (Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter) to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Also on the list from the US Government are two Vice Presidents (Charles Dawes and Al Gore) and five Secretaries of State who have been awarded the Prize. The fact that so many members of US government have been awarded the Peace Prize despite the fact that they have been directly responsible for many of the wars that the US has waged is not only shocking, but also confirms the partisan nature of the Committee.

The case for bias on part of the Committee is strengthened when one looks at the case of Gandhi not winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Mahatma Gandhi was nominated 5 times for the Peace Prize between 1938 and 1948, but was often rejected on the grounds that his efforts were towards the cause of one nation and not peace in general. When India gained independence in 1947 and the Gandhi’s nomination grew stronger, the Committee decided against awarding him the prize as he was too strongly committed to one side of belligerents in the India-Pakistan conflict post partition. In 1948, Gandhi was not awarded the Prize as the Committee did not award the Prize posthumously. However, in 1961 Dag Hammarskjöld was awarded the Prize posthumously as his nomination was made while he was alive. So, the Nobel Prize for Peace is not only a biased award but has also been used as a tool for political one-upmanship in pursuit of “Western Liberal-Intarnationalist Ideals”

Even if one were to accept the premise of the Committee in that Obama has strengthened international co-operation and diplomacy, two things stare in the face of such claims. One, while Obama has made the right noises in terms of his willingness to talk to countries that the US has difficult relations with, he has not made any appreciable changes to the foreign policy since Bush. Meaning that in terms of concrete action, Obama still follows the Bush regime but has appended it up with better PR. Two, even if Obama has succeeded in thawing the ice and creating a climate for peaceful negotiation rather than armed intervention, it must be pointed out that such a situation is fragile and is no mean achievement and the tables can be turned any day. So, instead of recognising efforts at creating lasting peace, the Nobel Committee has in fact lauded short-term achievements which may not lead to a peaceful resolution of disputes in a different time. In terms of awarding prematurely, 2009′s award bears resemblance to that of 1973 when Henry Kissinger and Lê Ðức Thọ (refused the award) were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the Paris Peace Accord, but soon after the US army left, South Vietnam quickly recaptured the rest of Vietnam, flouting the Paris Peace Accord rendering the Prize meaningless.

Therefore, the Nobel Peace Prize is far from the most prestigious prize for the preservation of peace as it does not recognise merit and are often recognitions of political effort and influence. The problem is in the amount of attention that is given to the Prize given its long tradition. But in the 21st century the Nobel Prize has long since lost it’s relevance and importance.

Lawyers and the Right to Strike

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

The hooliganism exhibited by advocates of the Karnataka High Court on November 9th brings into focus the issue of the right to strike of lawyers. Ignoring for the moment the causes for the protest by the Advocates Association of Bangalore (AAB), the right to strike  must be examined in isolation.

It is established law that though not a fundamental right, the right to strike is nevertheless, a legal right and this right extends to hospitals, educational institutions, trade unions and any legal association. However, the right to strike is not an absolute right and the restrictions on it vary from profession to profession. For instance, in the case of doctors, the right to strike is subject to the Medical Council of India’s Code of Ethics and Regulations which require that emergency care should not be denied to a patient under any circumstances. Whether lawyers have such a right and to what extent is the question that this article seeks to answer.

LAWYERS’ RIGHT TO STRIKE

Justice Rama Jois provides a very stinging opinion on the issue of the AAB strike in this piece in the Times of India where he dismisses the idea of an advocate’s right to strike on the grounds that the administration of justice is not a business. This is the prevailing view on the issue with many judgments expressing similar views. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of R N Sharma Advocate v. State of Haryana stated that the legal profession is not a trade or business and advocates being officers of the Court have to strive to secure justice for within legally permissible limits. Further on the issue of strikes by lawyers, the Supreme Court in the case of Raman Services Pvt. Ltd v. Subhash Kapoor has clearly stated that strikes by advocates is both illegal and unconstitutional.

The idea behind these judgements is that lawyers, being officers of justice should not themselves obstruct the administration of justice by striking and boycotting court proceedings. This, however does not entirely rule out the right to strike. The case of Ex Capt Harish Uppal v. Union of India,  decided by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court  allowed for strikes and boycotts in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention from work for not more than one day. So, while lawyers may have  right to strike, it arises only in the rarest of rare cases where the integrity of the Bar or the Bench is at stake.

THE CASE OF JUSTICE DINAKARAN

But what constitutes a threat to the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bench? Surely, a corrupt Chief Justice could threaten the integrity of the Court. That said, the allegations against Justice Dinakaran have not been proven. While the Supreme Court may have delinked Dinakaran’s name from the list of Judges recommended for elevation, it was to further the probe into the allegations as he had refuted the allegations levelled against him. Like in any case, he had to be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, and the lawyers being officers of the court had to allow the law to take it’s course. Thus, there was no prima facie threat to the integrity of the Court and the lawyers by turning unruly, in fact undermined the dignity of the Bar.

Furthermore, it wasn’t as if the Court did not recognise the right of the lawyers to strike. In the days leading up to the protest, a Division Bench of the High Court (constitued as it was a matter of some urgency) hearing a PIL against the  resolution by the AAB to organise the protest, had stayed the resolution. As an organisation that draws it’s legality from the Court, the AAB had to keep the High Court’s order in abeyance and not organise the protest.

In conclusion, the lawyers in this case went ahead with a protest which was not only based on valid grounds but was also explicitly prohibited by the Court. The violence which ensued served only to tarnish the reputation of the Justice system in whose interest it was supposedly conducted

The Fall and Fall of the BJP

The triumph of the Congress in the general elections has meant a further five years in the opposition for the BJP lead NDA and its back to the drawing room for the once famed team of strategists who seemed to not get anything wrong.

The next five years will be crucial for the BJP, for not only does the party need an overhaul and trust its second generation of leaders (who will be anointed in the days to come) but given the state of affairs at Ashoka Road, the challenge that stares the BJP in its face could be more existential than one would like to believe. An integral part of the revamping process would have to be a comprehensive breakdown of its electoral performance and an analysis of the verdict to shape the future course of action.

Already, analysts and party leaders are citing various reasons from an aggressive Hindutva campaign to a lack of substantial opposition to the UPA government’s policies (as opposed to the anti Manmohan campaign) as causes for their failure. But two aspects of their performance may have affected their performance more than others and may also be the primary reasons for their failure.

Before going into the actual causes, one feature of this election must be made clear. With the better than expected performance of the Congress, the media has been quick to hail the re-emergence of a ‘National Election’ as opposed to one that is determined by regional equations, as has been the case since the dawn of the ‘Coalition Era’. At this point, I hasten to clarify that despite the comparatively impressive haul of the Congress, the elections of 2009 was still fought and won on regional politics, and a national victory was a consequence of many victories won at the states.

That brings us to the question of the BJP’s poor performance. During its heyday under Atal Behari Vajpayee’s leadership, the BJP performed very well in certain key states, which were decidedly BJP strongholds. Though, the BJP did not have a nationwide presence (almost non-existent in the South) winning consistently in the Hindi heartland ensured the party had the numbers to lead a government at the centre. Compare this to the BJP’s performance in states like UP, Rajasthan and even Punjab for that matter. While the Congress made an unexpected comeback in UP, the BJP was wiped out in the state of Rajasthan not to mention the defeat of the SAD-BJP combine in Punjab. So while the Congress made gains in states where it had lost a foothold, the BJP failed to hold on to the seats it was expected to.

The second factor that cost the BJP this election was a lack of formidable alliances and more importantly, losing the alliances that it had. In the past, even if the BJP did not do particularly well or did not have presence in a particular state, it had credible alliance partners it could fall back on. But in these elections members of the NDA such as the BJD in Orissa left the NDA. In other states, the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance failed to deliver again in Maharashtra and in the South, the BJP has almost no presence except for the state of Karnataka with regional parties keeping away from the BJP.

So the task ahead for the BJP is now to not only fortify the states it used to control, but to also look to expand and put up a serious challenge in states (particularly the Southern states) where it does not have a presence. What is needed is the kind of grassroots level organisation that was seen over a decade in the state of Karnataka or even cobbling up an effective alliance as in Bihar with the JD(U). For as stated earlier the challenge that the BJP faces is that of its very existence, given the meteoric rise of the Congress across all regions, and the BJP must regroup in the best interests of democracy, as Advani recently acknowledged, for the first time in many years we may be headed towards a bi-party democracy. To keep such a system functioning a credible opposition is just as necessary, lest the horse trading politics of the 90’s should return.

Mamata Strikes Back: The Beginning of the End of the Left?

One of the remarkable stories of the recently concluded elections has to be the fall of the left in their bastion of West Bengal. Though the fall was not entirely unexpected (and even long overdue for some), the sheer magnitude of the mandate against the Left (specifically the CPI M) could make this a watershed election in that it has changed the political landscape of a state hitherto considered an electoral dead rubber for many years to come.

The bigger fallout of this outcome is surely the emergence of Mamata Banerjee as a player on the national stage, not to mention a possible change of guard in West Bengal too. Though the Trinamool Congress was a part of the Vajpayee lead government (with 8 seats) in 1999 it could not boast of the kind of leverage it now does (and may continue to hold if Mamata Banerjee plays her cards right). But, the results are seen (due to a lack of a better alternative) more as a vote against the Left rather than a vote in favour of Trinamool. Though this may seem unfair given the fact that we may be on the brink of the end of an almost 35 year rule by the Left in West Bengal, it is only natural considering the fact that the Trinamool has done little save for political posturing over the Nandigram issue. However, as the title of this article suggests this is only the beginning for Mamata Banerjee and she may do well to take a leaf out of YS Rajashekhar Reddy’s book, who swept to power riding a similar wave of anti-incumbency in 2004 and has over the last 5 years consolidated the mandate with a mix of populist measures and wily politicking.

Despite the positive results of the Lok Sabha election, the Trinamool Congress have their work cut out if they have to preserve the mandate that they have got. One of their biggest challenges is (ironically) Mamata Banerjee herself. In spite of her clean image and reputation for getting work done her antics in the Parliament and other public forums have ensured that she was never taken seriously as an opposition to the Communists. From threatening to commit suicide to attacking political rivals in Parliament she has done it all. Her temper has often affected her political decisions, like quitting the Congress party and then shuttling between NDA and the Congress at for alliances to tackle the Left. In the similarly resurgent Congress party she may have finally found an ally with common intentions and prospects in Bengal, but given her temper, a sudden exit from the alliance can never be fully ruled out. But given the long term potential of her alliance with the UPA, Mamata Banerjee will understand the need to keep this union intact beyond the immediate future.

Another aspect of Mamata’s leadership is the fact that there are no other leaders within the party worth mention making her the single and tallest leader of the Trinamool. This was seen during the negotiations for ministerial posts when the Trinamool asked for only one cabinet post despite the fact that they could have gotten more. This has been seen as a sign of not encouraging other leaders within the party. But, it is only natural considering the brief history of the party and given the fact that Mamata Banerjee almost singlehandedly built the party. While the Left may be all but done for in Bengal, many argue that the Trinamool may be worse off than the Left given their support to the Nandigram and Singur struggles. The rhetoric that Mamata played up during this time has lead many to believe that she is anti industrialisation and may reverse the development that the Left has brought about in recent times. I would disagree with this view given the fact that Mamata Banerjee was not a bad Railway Minister under the NDA and her earlier stint as a Sports Minister too didn’t see too many complaints on her conduct as a Minister. It was her conduct outside and her antics with those who disagreed with her that caught media attention and which has given her the image that everyone now perceives her to be.

The results may yet be a case of continuity rather than change, as one political analyst recently remarked, the success of the Trinamool may in reality be a case of one set of goons replacing another. While it is a widely accepted fact that the Left’s continuous electoral success was based on widespread rigging through “party machinery”, post-Nandigram may have seen a new set of goons take over from where their predecessors left off.

All said and done, based on the current trends, the Trinamool and the Congress seem poised to storm the West Bengal Assembly in 2011. However, 2011 is still two years away and as the adage goes anything can happen in politics.